Almost entire balance (2675 XMR) of Community Crowdfunding System (CCS) Monero wallet has been stolen

Timeline of events

In the last Monero General Fund transparency report in March 2023, the General Fund held 8452 XMR. As far as we know, this separate wallet is safe and unaffected. It would be possible to pay people with active CCS proposal from the General Fund, but nothing has been decided.

Wave,

A hard blow.

I’m thinking of Pegasus-like outliers that are out-of-scope or potentially rather governments.

Air gap may not be sufficiently safe in extreme cases.

Unimamo,

This raises the question about the General Fund wallet. How is it secured?

naphtha,

probably better

g2devi,

Something is seriously wrong. There’s a reason decentralisation is important. Anonymity or not, you never put all your eggs (digital or physical) in one basket for precisely this sort of reason. Once the wallet size reached a certain threshold (say 100 or 500 XMR), a new wallet should have been created for subsequent funds and the previous wallet should be in a hardware or paper wallet with a different trusted person ideally multisig. If funds were stolen via hack or the police forces the wallet holder to give up the keys, only a fifth (for a 500 XMR wallet) or a twenty fifth (for a 100 XMR wallet) of the amount would have been lost. If multisig is buggy, it need be ready for Seraphis. If it’s just a matter of UI, then it needs to made usable and widely adopted. Remember, one of the key advantages of Monero is that it make privacy easier. You can try use Bitcoin and go through a lot of hoops to get privacy and forever stay vigilant, or just use Monero. Multisig and managing multiple accounts should be at most as difficult as Bitcoin.

rah,

Ooof

rbesfe,

Womp womp

Saki,

Is multisig such far from being practical yet? Does that also mean Bisq-like platform (Haveno) is still far from being practical?

A Monero user tends to proudly think that Monero is good, rather philosophical, being actually used for good reasons, and community-based… but it’s been hacked… I guess people will laugh now. Everyone can draw a lesson from this, though…

@UncleIroh “Windows 10” is obviously alarming, this doesn’t seem as simple like that, like pointed out in the linked thread. Maybe password-based (not key file) SSH was the problem? Btw that “someone” is hinto-janai, the person providing gupax among other things!

ErC,

Is multisig such far from being practical yet?

It is not. See this comment of mine on reddit and fluffypony’s answer: old.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/…/k7mj2he/

Saki,

Thank you very much. You pointed out there: “Nobody really used it, so it ended up being unstable and full of problems” and there was a reply, saying you “can’t really force anybody to use something”.

I’d like to add another point of view. With reliably working multisig, we can have our own Bisq-esque DEX (at least in principle), and many people would love to use it, once it’s really available, right? For example, one might be able to sell and buy XMR in a safe and reliable way. Or eventually, though this might sound like a pipe dream but at least in theory, we might have a P2P proxy-store, where basically anyone can offer doing any shopping they can do for you. Just like on Bisq, both send securities first to discourage any cheats. When the seller ships whatever you’re buying, they “confirm” (or sign). When you receives it and everything is fine, you confirm too. Then, and only then, your security will be back and the seller will receive the locked xmr you initially deposit, and everyone will be happy. Multisig seems necessary (if not sufficient) for this to work.

we had become complacent because everything had “worked just fine” for so long.

This comment of fluffyponyza is also understandable. Generally, a programmer doesn’t want to change things when it’s working fine. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” In this case, something was (easy to) broken, though. Hindsight is 20/20.

Given that multisig is already available (just not yet well-tested), let’s stop joking like “We should keep our Monero in some other coin,” and try to think a bit more positively. At the very least it has been clearly demonstrated that Monero is so private that even core developers can’t trace it…

Troddit version links (a Tor-friendly instance) troddit.esmailelbob.xyz/r/Monero/…/k7mj2he - Onion -> …esmail5pdn24shtvieloeedh7ehz3nrwcdivnfhfcedl7gf4…

tusker,

It may make sense to store CSS funds in another coin that is more multisig/offline singing friendly until we have an easy to use mutisig in monero. Then convert to XMR for payouts.

If crypto experts cannot keep funds safe then the average user has no hope.

admin,

DAI multisig on Ethereum, would also solve the volatility problem. Additionally it would show just how much we believe in our own coin ._.

z0rg0n,

What problems are there with Monero’s multisig implementation?

tusker, (edited )

Well, they were not using multisig on a team controlled wallet with 2.6k XMR, that tells you all you need to know about the multisig implementation.

shortwavesurfer,

FUUUUCK! will be very interested to see what is found that caused the breach.

UncleIroh,
@UncleIroh@merovingian.club avatar

@shortwavesurfer @Rucknium

Seconded.

With only 2 known keyholders and likely 1 single person with physical access to the Qubes laptop, and where the whole key and wallet were probably stored in a standalone offline vault-vm, what the fuck happened?

UncleIroh,
@UncleIroh@merovingian.club avatar

@shortwavesurfer @Rucknium

I see. They held the hot wallet on Windows fucking 10.

Unbelievable. Opsec? What's Opsec?

UncleIroh,
@UncleIroh@merovingian.club avatar

@shortwavesurfer @Rucknium

As pointed out in the github thread by someone, the more useful opsec flow should have gone something like this.

And make the offline computer an offline vault-vm on a non-internet Qubes laptop .

tusker,

How anyone that understands crypto is using windows in the year 2023 is beyond me. You cannot fix laziness with FOSS.

UncleIroh,
@UncleIroh@merovingian.club avatar

@tusker

It's worse than that.

Fiscal responsibility alone dictates that you have a duty to create a public Opsec Charter of sorts.

And that's nothing to say of an ideological-FOSS duty to create the same.

This reeks of more than incompetence.

alphonse,

F

XmrLovingAncap,

F

dragonsidedd,
@dragonsidedd@sciencemastodon.com avatar
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