Every car I’ve hired in the last ten years has the current speed limit displayed on the dashboard. It does not require the car to communicate any information, only to receive it.
That is a different question from how car manufacturers could abuse the requirement to get more data to sell, of course. But there’s nothing in this bill that would require the car to collect any data that isn’t already publicly displayed by the roadside.
Driven by wider political agendas which included the protection of Japanese inward investment in UK plc, Blair ruled that the Post Office must purchase a salvaged version of Horizon. Insufficient work had been done to determine the viability of this option and the Post Office itself was adamantly opposed to the idea. Right up until the day before the Prime Minister’s decision, the Post Office were vociferous; they wished to terminate Horizon and start afresh with a new supplier.
The report, and a summary which I’ve taken that quote from, are hosted on the JFSA website:
After many months of detailed research, long-time supporter of the Subpostmaster campaign, Eleanor Shaikh, has very kindly allowed her recently completed report into the early history of how Post Office’s flawed Horizon computer system came into existence to be made available from the JFSA website.
At almost 600 pages, ‘Origins of a Disaster’ gives an in depth analysis of the discussions and decisions taken from 1998-2000, heavily referencing Government documents, naming all those involved and the ‘hands on’ approach adopted by the Prime Minister Tony Blair at the time the final decision to proceed was taken.
Eleanor has also produced a six page summary of her report which she has made available.
They will no doubt prosecute some tiny fish doing the bidding of the sharks who paid their salaries. They’re not going to touch the real villains.
The reconfigured Horizon, presented by Ministers in May 1999 as a pristine, state-of-the-art triumph, was in fact the product of a last-ditch, fourth-choice deal in which the Government knowingly accepted a sub-optimal system; it knew Horizon had always been subject to accounting integrity issues, both before and after reconfiguration. But too much was riding on Horizon’s much- delayed rollout; the raft of reforms heralded in the 1999 Post Office White Paper; the credibility of the Modernising Government agenda; the reputation of ICL; ambitions for PFI; and the priceless nerve of Japanese investors. All of these were preconditions which New Labour needed to tease the green shoots of its social and economic renewal.
Once the Prime Minister had made his decision in May 1999, there were to be no more doubts voiced about the system, no more delays or dissent. Inconvenient truths pertaining to its integrity had to be worked around and airbrushed from view. Indeed, the favourable light in which the Government was to present the reconfiguration was one of the few bargaining chips it held for negotiations with ICL/Fujitsu. With the exception of a brief glimpse into the system’s failings which slipped out under cover of parliamentary privilege in 1999, Ministers and officialdom fell into line behind the Government’s sanitised narrative of Horizon.
Reminiscent of the Twitter joke trial. Except this obvious joke was made in private, so there’s even less excuse for the over-reaction. Useless timewasters.
Proposed CA bill would electronically restrict cars from going 10mph over speed limit (abc7.com)
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Fujitsu will never be held accountable for the Post Office scandal. It is too important to this government | Sam Fowles (www.theguardian.com)
An airline passenger could face a $120,000 bill after fighter jets were scrambled when he joked about blowing up the plane (www.businessinsider.com)