I have ventured into the genre of reaction videos. Military analyst Michael Kofman has argued that #Ukraine made a mistake when they decided to fight for Bakhmut, and that it undermined their preparations for the counteroffensive. Supposedly this is one of the reasons why the offensive has not delivered more results. Kofman is an influential figure, so I think it's important to point out that there are weaknesses in his argument. https://youtu.be/rNw4wkkibso
@anderspuck great video Anders👍 what is your take on the article from The Guardian about all the mines hindering breakthroughs and Ukraine running low on Sappers? Is it a real problem or is it blown up by the Media….
Thanks
@anderspuck I sure feel bad about the West whining of the slow progress of the counteroffensive…
Ben Hodges said recently that the U.S. and Allies would never use infantry without air support - which Ukraine hasn’t . Seems like Washington is kind of halfway committed here….Berlin much the same.
Too many theoreticians who think that it's like pieces on chessboard. After all that had been said (too much, really) one UA officer's words seem stuck in my head, that I thought were axiomatic but aren't: "You can't know how strong enemy is, until you actually enter the fight." One of the UA's takes on Bakhmut was simple: a point where strength of the enemy could be gauged.
It takes 3-1 to be offensive vs the defending part.
you can also expect to have up to 50% losses during a military offensive
In most cases you also use different kind of equipment/forces when defending vs offensive and during the battle of Bakhmut I didn’t see any western weaponry being used.
So I think Anders is spot on in his assessment
@anderspuck Hey 🙂 great video! I like the new outdoors background. It has a soothing effect when talking about very serious subjects. It also gives your videoes a visual perspective, which looks really nice 🌲🌳
@sarahbeck Yes, I have also come to like it. In the beginning it was just a fallback solution, but now I think it is better. I think it’s mostly a summer thing, though. 😊
@anderspuck Good little talk. At the time, I wondered about Zelensky's decision, but I figured he was taking international and/or domestic politics into account when he made it. After all, we don't usually see him as the face of specific military operational decisions. 1/2
@anderspuck Good video! My armchair generalship of course would object to a charge that Ukraine has not achieved with western tactics what was hoped, with a quiet query about whether that depended more on that which has not been provided to Ukraine - air power.
@maxieq
More importantly it depends on small minefields that are easy to go around. Western maneuvers seem unlikely to work even with air support. Well they could clear the minefields faster without having to dodge artillery, but even still it would be a slow slog.
@bluGill@anderspuck Ukraine have shown that they can use manouver warfare, like in the Kharkiv region. It's not like they can't use it. I just think that Moltke's law about battleplans, ie that no such thing survives the first contact with the enemy, is very true. Particularly if you spend months talking about the battle plan in the media.
I think this is an important video, and I appreciate the insight into the rivalry around this issue.
Regarding the breaking of Wagner, I agree that this was a victory, and it shows that a Ukrainian asymmetric advantage is their political cohesion. Putin now had to scrap one form of outsourcing the war, and has been forced to use ways to mobilise people that he was politically reluctant to use.
But is that the same as an endorsement of Ukrainian decision-making? Can we really argue that the decision to hang on in Bakhmut was taken in order to break Wagner and with that aim in mind?
Even though that was the eventual effect, I still worry that the Bakhmut decision, like other decisions, reflects a Ukrainan desire to have political trophies to show the West, or to do things that feed a Western media narrative.
@Loukas It's possible, and obviously there will also be bad decisions on the Ukrainian side. I think the decision to hang on in Bakhmut was an attempt to force the Russians to remain on the offensive in a location where Ukraine could manage it. Russia could not be allowed to get a break, and the last thing they needed was to be forced to start the counteroffensive too soon.
Thank Anders, as always you make a well thought point.
Of course, everyone is wondering why Ukraine troops aren’t sipping tea in the cafes of Sevastopol after Budanov made claims that they would sweep to victory.
Do you think that Ukraine was delayed by just the minefields as they seem to claim? And if so, why do you think that the problem wasn’t foreseen?
@chowderman I think there were unrealistic expectations about what could be achieved with maneuver warfare. It looks like this idea was pushed upon the Ukrainians by NATO countries that didn’t really understand the challenge of fighting without air superiority. Ukraine tried this approach for about two weeks in June, and then they went back to a more realistic concept.
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