I have conducted a background check on HiCA administrator Xiaohui Lam and would like to share the following with you. These findings are for reference only, so please evaluate them for yourself.
First, in 2013, Xiaohui Lam hijacked AFF promotions by exploiting vulnerabilities in Aliyun forums, defrauded hostloc members by installing backdoors in Discuz forum plugins, and stole others' social accounts through leaked data from CSDN [^1].
Second, in 2015, Xiaohui Lam exploited a vulnerability in the GlobalSign system to sell a large number of 5-year wildcard certificates, but all certificates were revoked after they were discovered [^2].
I would like to emphasize that these are past actions of HiCA administrators and I do not think he will repeat the same mistakes again. However, these events show that he is not a developer who knows very little about security. In the past, he has been someone who knew how to mine vulnerabilities, exploit them and commit fraud and threats against customers.
Based on the above findings, I believe we need to take the following steps:
Considering that he suggested users to execute his script RCE[^3] with root privileges on his official website, we should send a reminder email to all users who have applied for a certificate, asking them to evaluate whether there is unauthorized code on their machines.
the results of the query found that Mr. Lam has two CAs: HiCA and Quantum CA. the website for registration information about Quantum CA is acme.hi.cn. then we need to confirm whether they are using the same infrastructure and whether Quantum CA also uses RCE to issue certificates [^4].
Mr. Lam has shut down HiCA's infrastructure after he was found to be using RCE, but we still need to do a more detailed assessment.
As a member of the community, I believe transparency and trust are vital to us. I hope Mr. Lam will provide the community with a more complete statement and evidence so that the community can evaluate this incident.
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