ooni,
@ooni@mastodon.social avatar

❗️Tanzania: Surge in online LGBTIQ censorship and other targeted blocks
https://ooni.org/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/

Our latest report documents extensive LGBTIQ censorship & the blocking of Change.org, Global Fund for Women, GlobalGiving, Open Society Foundations, Clubhouse and ProtonVPN (among others) in #Tanzania based on OONI data. 🧵

#ooni #opendata #censorship

ooni,
@ooni@mastodon.social avatar

As part of our report, we analyzed OONI data collected from #Tanzania between Jan 2023-Jan 2024.

We found numerous LGBTIQ websites blocked, which correlates with the escalating crackdown on LGBTIQ communities in Tanzania in recent years.
https://ooni.org/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/#blocking-of-lgbtiq-websites

ooni,
@ooni@mastodon.social avatar

OONI data from #Tanzania shows the blocking of:
• LGBTIQ social networks (e.g Grindr)
• LGBTIQ rights sites (e.g ILGA and OutRight International)
• LGBTIQ news and culture sites (e.g Queerty)
• LGBTIQ suicide prevention site (The Trevor Project)
https://ooni.org/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/#blocking-of-lgbtiq-websites

ooni,
@ooni@mastodon.social avatar

Many other blocks identified as part of our study appear to be targeted, as they involve specific websites, while other sites from the same categories were found accessible.

For example, access to the Global Fund for Women website was found blocked in #Tanzania, while Amnesty International's website was found accessible.
https://ooni.org/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/

ooni,
@ooni@mastodon.social avatar

Tanzania recently started requiring users to report their use of VPNs.

Out of tested VPNs, we only found ProtonVPN blocked in #Tanzania.

We encourage researchers to explore whether the new VPN reporting requirement results in reduced VPN use in Tanzania.
https://ooni.org/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/#blocking-of-protonvpn

ooni,
@ooni@mastodon.social avatar

Overall, our analysis of OONI data from show that most ISPs appear to implement blocks by means of TLS interference, specifically by timing out the session after the ClientHello message during the TLS handshake.

As the timing of the blocks and the types of URLs blocked are (mostly) consistent across (tested) networks, ISPs in Tanzania likely implement blocks in a coordinated manner (possibly through the use of Deep Packet Inspection technology).
https://ooni.org/post/2024-tanzania-lgbtiq-censorship-and-other-targeted-blocks/

ooni,
@ooni@mastodon.social avatar

We thank OONI Probe users in Tanzania for contributing measurements, supporting this study. ❤️

fj,
@fj@mastodon.social avatar

@ooni Does that also happen after an Encrypted Client Hello? 🤔
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-esni/

ooni,
@ooni@mastodon.social avatar

@fj Thanks for your question 🙏 We have an ECH test, but it's not integrated into the OONI Probe apps yet. If ECH is working as intended we would expect this kind of blocking to not work, assuming they aren't blocking the ECH protocol itself.

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