What it says is, don’t buy Boeing, buy Airbus instead.
For years I’ve always checked that the plane I’m on is an Airbus because the few Boeing’s I’ve been on rattled like mad and the build quality and materials used were clearly rubbish. I’m not surprised the doors are falling off…
Its kind of scary to think of how the profit motive is capable of decaying even our basic infastructure and transportation. Hopefully it serves as some sort ofwake up call and change comes before things deteriorate any further.
This comes as close to perfectly capturing my dismay and horror at the devolution of Boeing in the last few decades, as well as describing a level of rigor that I deeply wish was far more prevalent in engineering as a general practice across all industries these days. But “driving shareholder value” (thanks for that, Milton Friedman) is crushing one of the primary aspects that I think made American engineering so outstanding for so long.
MBA have been destroying the foundation of everything for excess profit and we’re only seeing the beginning.
Even this fucking article ends with “A company that is not securing its bolts correctly is unlikely to be making the kinds of strategic decisions that pay dividends in decades to come.” As if that is the ultimate goal. Not less death. Less accidents. More money.
People who were not going to be engineers got interested in engineering, and made their own heroes, like Jobs, the defining traits of whom in their myths were all about ruining a good culture.
As if that is the ultimate goal. Not less death. Less accidents. More money.
I’m pretty sure the author agrees with you. Not every dividend is monetary. He’s talking about the long lasting effects to security and how that will “pay out” in the years that follow
Great article. The most concerning is that Boeing has become yet another enshittified company, chasing profit too hard over all else, and they are going to kill people with their decisions.
“The fact that the mistake was made at all, however, suggests an organization that is decreasingly inclined, or able, to make the kinds of costly, counterintuitive, and difficult-to-justify choices on which it built its exemplary history of reliability. These choices always pertain to marginal, almost negligible, concerns — simply because reliability at high altitudes is all about the margins — so their consequences manifest slowly. But their effects are cumulative and inexorable. “
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