@tef I cannot stop thinking about this video from three months before the incident— breaking down two separate problems, requiring expensive recalls/repairs at the end of Max manufacturing, which the vlogger ascribes to Boeing spinning off parts of their operations to save money, then having quality problems because half of their manufacturing was now technically under a different company they're constantly struggling with. Check your anon post and sure enough… Spirit https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmJgweFmoxs&t=320s
@tef I am not a physical engineer but it's hard not to draw a line from a known incident where a minor but potentially dangerous systemic production issue is found and fixed at the last minute before ship and everyone breathes a sigh of relief, and then a separate minor but potentially dangerous systemic production issue causes a door to fall off an airplane in flight months later…
@tef …and not think of the Challenger investigations, and descriptions of a culture where near misses kept happening and rather than this sounding an alarm over "we have a lot of near misses, we need to find and address the systemic problems causing this" it lead to a mindset more like "all of these near misses have turned out perfectly okay, so it turns out the process works well"
@tef McD-D learned better for a generation ater the DC-10 disaster; problem is, that was early 70s, so by the mid-90s the managers who remembered it had all left … and then the re-toxified McD-D merged with Boeing and essentially did a reverse management take-over.
@tef ask any urban South Floridian about the cycle of hurricane awareness (including both preparedness and compliance with building regulations). It's been 30ish years since Andrew, so we're due again.
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