Morishima, to security
@Morishima@ieji.de avatar
183231bcb, to random

Can anymany tell me how I'm "supposed" to use end-to-end encryption with XMPP?

As far as I can tell there are three totally different ways to do E2EE:

a)OTR : "[https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0364.html](Not intended to be a current standard), or technical specification, as better (albeit, newer and less well tested) methods of end-to-end encryption exist for XMPP. "

b)OpenPGP: There are at least two different XEPs about it. XEP-0027 is obsolete, while XEP-0373 is "experimental" but hasn't been updated in almost three years.

c)OMEMO: "Experimental" and hasn't been updated in over two years.

Is there a way to do E2EE in XMPP which is neither deprecated nor experimental? What's the "Current stable" way to do it?

alshafei, to privacy
@alshafei@mastodon.social avatar

An overview of how @simplex works and what sets it apart from other messaging apps and protocols:

https://linuxiac.com/simplex-chat/

"SimpleX is one of the most private and secure chat and applications platform that you can find out there."

openrightsgroup, to privacy
@openrightsgroup@social.openrightsgroup.org avatar

UK Civil Society and the Tech Industry join forces to warn of new 'Mass surveillance' fears. https://bbc.co.uk/news/technology-68625232 -

openrightsgroup, to privacy
@openrightsgroup@social.openrightsgroup.org avatar

Do you share our concerns with Government's plans to control the UK's tech industry and force them to place secret backdoors in their software? If so then take action today and write to your MP https://action.openrightsgroup.org/write-your-mp-about-threats-our-online-security-and-privacy -

openrightsgroup, to FreeSpeech
@openrightsgroup@social.openrightsgroup.org avatar

Last week we published our response to Ofcom's Online Safety Act (UK) consultation.

We've raised concerns about the threat to free expression in requirements to proactively screen users' social media content and measures that undermine end-to-end encryption.

Find out more ⬇️

https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/a-dangerous-precedent-for-global-censorship/

trendless, (edited ) to privacy
@trendless@zeroes.ca avatar

Yet another reason why your private messages should be stored on a server you control or e2ee (ideally, both): it's likely the pseudonyms and accounts you use can be linked back to your IRL identity... and sold to anyone willing to pay

> This Global Identity System Tracks Everything You Do Online https://www.privateinternetaccess.com/blog/global-identity-system-tracks-you/

CenDemTech, to random
@CenDemTech@techpolicy.social avatar

🚨 Late last night, @CenDemTech joined ACLU, @eff & research scholar @riana in filing a brief urging NV district court to reject efforts of the AG to prevent people in Nevada from using an messaging service if they are under the age of 18. https://cdt.org/insights/cdt-defends-encryption-against-broadside-attack-from-nevada-ag/

internetsociety, to random
@internetsociety@techpolicy.social avatar

Last night we joined an effort to stop the State of Nevada from making it easier for children’s personal information to be obtained by child predators, criminal gangs, foreign nations, and others.

Together with the ACLU, @riana , @eff , @CenDemTech , @mozilla , @fight , and @signalapp , and Access Now, we filed an amicus brief asking the court to protect children by ensuring they can use the most secure communication possible!

Read more:
https://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2024/03/nevada-wants-to-reduce-online-protections-for-children/

youronlyone, to security
@youronlyone@c.im avatar

To security experts: Do you use for services that are already end-to-end encrypted? Or, you add their apps in split-tunnelling mode?

Or, to rephrase it: is there any use in keeping end-to-end encrypted apps behind a VPN?

This is under the assumption that all things are equal (no ISP issues; no need to bypass any network set up; end-to-end encryption is enabled by default).

je5perl, to random
@je5perl@eupolicy.social avatar

The Going Dark High-Level Group is suggesting that the EU should be more like China/Iran and block access to communications services which do not comply with (also suggested) EU law on lawful interception for all types of communications services ("level playing field"), including of course secure OTT services.

Source: background document for HLG plenary on 1 March https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/document/download/26f7710a-ae4b-4616-a062-99fc93680bed_en?filename=HLG-background-document-01032024_en.pdf

boris, to opensource
@boris@toolsforthought.social avatar

Ente @ente just announced open sourcing their full backend.

It’s an end-to-end encrypted “alternative to Google or Apple photos”, licensed as AGPL.

Their client code had always been open source, this completes making the entire service available.
https://ente.io/blog/open-sourcing-our-server/

jonyoder, to Kotlin
@jonyoder@mstdn.social avatar

Having one of those "is this real?" moments. Why?

I just finished writing a code test which creates and queues for delivery an end-to-end encrypted email-like message in somewhere around 10-15 lines of code.

Think about it. It's starting getting real. SQUEEEE!!!

Nothing to show just yet, but I'm getting close.

ianonymous3000, to privacy
@ianonymous3000@mastodon.social avatar

🚨 Important update from @signalapp 🚨
The latest update (v7 on Desktop):
✅ Keep your phone number hidden
✅ Choose to share a username instead
✅ Take control with new privacy settings - You decide who finds you by phone number.

glynmoody, to Bulgaria
@glynmoody@mastodon.social avatar

New government attempt to bulk search private messages and destroy secure end-to-end encryption - https://netzpolitik.org/2024/chatkontrolle-der-rat-will-es-nochmal-versuchen/#2024-02-22_Presidency_LEWP_CSAR_New-approach_6850 they are determined to undermine

joeo10, to privacy
@joeo10@mastodon.sdf.org avatar

Meanwhile at the same time, Nevada is currently trying to grant a temporary restraining order to ban Meta/FB from rolling out end-to-end-encryption or , threating and in the process. https://www.techdirt.com/2024/02/26/nevada-is-in-court-this-morning-looking-to-get-a-temporary-restraining-order-blocking-meta-from-using-end-to-end-encryption/

Here's @mmasnick:

"This is a full-on attack on encryption. If Nevada succeeds here, then it’s opening up courts across the country to outlaw entirely. This is a massive, dangerous attack on security and deserves much more attention."

CenDemTech, to random
@CenDemTech@techpolicy.social avatar

Today, a district court in Nevada is hearing a case about whether Meta should have to comply with the state AG’s demand for a temporary restraining order to stop Meta from offering end-to-end () on Facebook’s Messenger for children in Nevada under the age of 18.

@CenDemTech opposes this unprecedented assault on children’s use of . https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/2024-02-20-NV-State-Motion-for-TRO-and-Prelim-Injunction-on-OST.pdf

chris, to apple
@chris@mstdn.chrisalemany.ca avatar

Fascinating ... Apple joins Signal to provide the most secure end-to-end encrypted messaging protocols. Note: Apple engineers created their own “Levels” and magically theirs is the highest. ;) But regardless, this is obviously strong encryption.

"Support for PQ3 will start to roll out with the public releases of iOS 17.4, iPadOS 17.4, macOS 14.4, and watchOS 10.4, and is already in the corresponding developer preview and beta releases.”

https://security.apple.com/blog/imessage-pq3/

ilyess, to apple
@ilyess@mastodon.online avatar

strengthens iMessage end-to-end encryption with post-quantum cryptography: PQ3.

"iMessage now meets this goal with a new cryptographic protocol that we call PQ3, offering the strongest protection against quantum attacks and becoming the only widely available messaging service to reach Level 3 security"

https://security.apple.com/blog/imessage-pq3/

yawnbox, to apple
@yawnbox@disobey.net avatar

iMessage quantum security arrives with iOS 17.4 - @9to5Mac

This would have been the perfect article to remind people that all of this E2EE doesn’t matter if you backup your iMessages in iCloud, where they will be backed up clear-text to Apple/NSA, unless both parties turn on Advanced Data Protection

https://9to5mac.com/2024/02/21/imessage-quantum-security-ios-17-4/

thibaultamartin, to Signal
@thibaultamartin@mamot.fr avatar

Huge feature rolled out in beta by the @signalapp team: Signal now supports usernames so you don't have to share your phone number 👏

Massive props to them, this was a feature many people were waiting for, and it's a huge step forward in terms of privacy

https://signal.org/blog/phone-number-privacy-usernames/

sourcerer, to security
@sourcerer@bsd.cafe avatar

Backdoors that let cops decrypt messages violate human rights, EU court says

One of comments about the title:

"Contrary to what the headline says, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, is not an EU court. It is part of the Council of Europe, which is older than the EU and has more members, and is mainly concerned with human rights related issues.

The EU has its own Court, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Luxembourg.

Edit: just to add, the article gets all the nuances right and refers to the Council of Europe and even to possible endorsement by the CJEU, so the problem is only with the headline."

https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2024/02/human-rights-court-takes-stand-against-weakening-of-end-to-end-encryption/

Another article + discussion https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39369653

@security

tuxdevices, (edited ) to Europe
@tuxdevices@fosstodon.org avatar
yawnbox, to random
@yawnbox@disobey.net avatar

@cwtch is by far my most favorite . it's , and end to end encryption () is built in with onion services. no setting up any infrastructure required, it's built on the back of the distributed @torproject operator network. no phone number is necessary, and you can have isolated IDs (profiles) for everyone you talk to

thatprivacyguy, to privacy
@thatprivacyguy@eupolicy.social avatar

European Court of Human Rights bans weakening of - a death knell for

https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng/?i=001-230854 (para 76 onwards)

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